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Unga arbetare har under senare decennier mött betydande svårigheter i många 
högutvecklade ekonomier när det gäller både sysselsättning och lön. En av 
förklaringarna är att teknisk förändring och globalisering har verkat till 
nackdel för mindre kvalificerade arbetare i allmänhet, och att unga har 
drabbats extra hårt genom sin bristande praktik. För att teorin ska kunna 
värderas måste trenderna isoleras från cykliska rörelser på efterfrågesidan 
och från storleksförändringar hos ungdomspopulationen och studiefrekvens på 
tillgångssidan. Artikeln beräknar för tretton OECD-ekonomier nationella 
förändringar av relativlön och sysselsättning för unga vuxna män, med hänsyn 
taget till efterfrågans cykliska karaktär och demografiska förändringar. 
Under beaktande även av förändringar i studiefrekvensen, kalkylerade med 
hjälp av en ²pseudoskattning² (där även vissa gymnasieelever och 
vuxenstuderande räknas in), framträder en negativ tendens i den relativa 
efterfrågan på yngre arbetskraft i sex länder, inklusive USA, Storbritannien 
och Frankrike, men inte i Tyskland eller Japan. Materialet från de andra fem 
länderna, däribland Sverige och Finland, medger inga bestämda slutsatser. De 
nationella institutionernas heterogena karaktär ifråga om både 
lönesättningen och övergången från skola till arbetsliv bidrar till såväl 
nationell mångfald som begränsad beviskraft.     3
There is nowadays a widespread sense that things have gone badly wrong for young 
workers in advanced economies, and that the difficulty is caused by a fall in their 
appeal to employers. 
 
It is tempting to attribute the problem to a trend in labour demand that favours 
older, more experienced workers over younger, less experienced ones. The same line 
of interpretation has been widely favoured for the other major dimension of employee 
skill: educational attainment. The contemporary fall in the pay of less educated 
workers, as compared to more educated ones, in the US and the UK in particular, has 
been widely attributed to the spread of information technology and globalisation, both 
of which are taken to raise the productivity of more educated workers relative to less 
educated ones. An influential account of developments in the US claims that ‘relative 
demand shifts favouring more skilled workers are … essential to understanding 
longer-run changes in the US wage structure’ (Katz and Autor 1999: 1513). The same 
factors might had similar effects in the experience dimension of skill, thereby 
impairing labour market prospects for young workers. 
 
The validity of these propositions has however been contested. Doubts have 
been raised concerning the existence of skill-bias in technical change (Card and 
DiNardo 2002). Some commentaries deny the existence of an underlying trend 
unfavourable to youth (OECD 2002: 20-29).  
 
This paper investigates the evidence concerning trends in youth relative pay 
and employment in developed economies since the mid-1970s, focusing on structural 
change on the demand-side of the labour market. It improves on previous research by 
including more countries, and by controlling for macroeconomic fluctuations, which 
affect youth employment particularly keenly. It then considers the growth of 
educational participation, as a further, supply-side, influence that complicates the 
interpretation of changes in youth outcomes. 
 
Evidence of trends in youth outcomes 
 
  The marked deterioration in youth outcomes in the US labour market after the 
early 1970s was highlighted by Levy and Murnane (1992). Blanchflower and 
Freeman (2000: 3) subsequently affirmed that account, noting its relevance to other 
economies, and claiming that over the same period youth labour market outcomes had 
deteriorated in ‘virtually all OECD countries’. The evidence from which they 
generalised did not however include pay as well as employment and unemployment. 
 
In my own work on the issue, I therefore considered changes in both youth 
pay and youth employment, and controlled on the supply-side for demographic 
swings in the size of the youth population. The resulting pattern showed marked 
differences across countries. Figure 1 shows the change in seven countries in the pay 
and employment of young males, relative to those of prime age adult males, during 
the longest period after 1975 for which data are available on both variables. The 
origin, in the upper right hand corner, represents no deterioration in youth relative 
outcomes in the labour market. Countries located towards the left of the diagram have 
experienced a decline in youth relative employment; those towards the bottom, a 
decline in youth relative pay.  
   4
The labour market position of young workers deteriorated significantly, 
relative to that of adults, in four of the seven countries – France, Sweden, the UK, and 
the US – but remained broadly stable in three others – France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. In the former four countries, the youth-related deterioration involved 
predominantly relative pay in the UK and the US, and relative employment in France 
and Sweden (Ryan 2001, Figure 2). 
 
The data were confined to male youth, rather than all youth, in order to control 
for changes in adult labour force participation, which have been much larger for 
females; and to young adults rather than all youth, as data on pay were less complete 
for teenagers. Employment was measured as a share of the population in the relevant 
age group, in order to control for demographic swings in the youth and adult 
populations. 
 
I interpreted the pattern in Figure 1 in terms of three factors. The first was 
skill-biased technical change: a general tendency in advanced economies for youth 
relative outcomes to deteriorate as part of a growing preference by employers for 
more over less experienced employees. The second concerned national school-to-
work institutions. The exemption of Germany and Japan from the adverse trend in 
youth outcomes was attributed respectively to mass apprenticeship and school-
employer hiring networks, as favourable influences on school-to-work transitions.  
The third was national institutions of pay-setting. More centralised and coordinated 
pay setting, which leads to mean narrower differences in pay between social groups 
and less responsiveness of pay differentials to conditions in the labour market, 
determined whether the effects of the deterioration in the demand for youth labour in 
the first four countries changed prices (a fall in relative pay) or quantities (a fall in 
relative employment). 
 
  These inferences were tentative, consistent with the small number of countries 
studied and the difficulty of explaining the trend in the Netherlands, which lacks any 
distinctively effective school-to-work institutions. The pattern in Figure 1 is striking, 
but it offers limited support to the hypothesis of a widespread demand-side trend to 
the disadvantage of young workers. 
 
  This paper adopts the same approach to the same issue, and takes it further. It 
examines the effects of including more countries and controlling for cyclical 
fluctuations on the demand side of the labour market. It then considers the 
implications of increased youth participation in formal education, which reduces the 
supply of youth labour, but may itself be caused by adverse trends in the demand for 




The simple economics of youth outcomes in the labour market involves three 
components: the demand side, the supply side, and pay determination.   
 
On the demand side, the central issue is the appeal of young workers to 
employers, as compared to that of adults. Employers are assumed to maximise profits. 
In doing so, they prefer to employ different categories of worker according to two 
attributes: relative productivity and relative labour cost. If the relative productivity of   5
young workers rises, or their relative pay falls, then, holding other factors constant, 
employers will demand relatively more youth labour. The relative demand for youth 
labour is then negatively related to its relative price. The easier it is for employers to 
substitute youth and adult employees in production, the more sensitive the demand for 
youth labour is to its price. 
 
  Changes in employers’ relative demand for young workers may not become 
effective immediately. In countries with strong employment protection laws, it takes 
time for employment patterns to respond to changes in employers’ desires – for 
example, if the price of youth labour falls, employers may find it difficult to lay off 
adult employees in order to replace them with young ones, and manage to adjust only 
as the other sources of labour turnover (quits and retirements) permit them to hire 
young workers. Employment protection law is however unlikely to be a major 
consideration for the trends considered here, which potentially disfavour young 
workers – for whom employment protection is generally weaker than for adults. 
 
The position of the demand curve for youth labour is affected by changes in 
technology and trade. At any relative price, to the extent that technical change or the 
growth of international trade reduces the productivity of youth relative to adult 
employees, the relative demand for young workers falls.      
 
Second, the supply of youth labour – i.e., the number of young workers 
available for employment, relative to adults – is assumed to be largely unresponsive to 
youth relative pay. It is however expected to vary strongly with two other factors. The 
first is the relative size of the youth population, as successive ‘baby boom’ cohorts 
enter and leave the youth labour market. The second concerns education – the share of 
young people who decide to remain in post-compulsory schooling, which varies 
strongly across time and country. Demographic swings are in principle independent of 
conditions in the youth labour market, but changes in educational participation are 
potentially influenced by them. 
 
Finally, there is the way in which the relative pay of young and adult workers, 
and thus the relative price of youth labour, is determined. The ‘supply-demand-
institutions’ approach considers two polar cases: competitive and coordinated pay 
setting, associated with market clearing and pay rigidity, respectively (Katz and Autor 
1999). 
 
In the competitive model of the labour market, price responds to the difference 
between demand and supply. If the (relative) demand for youth labour exceeds its 
supply, the relative pay of young workers falls. The same decline in relative pay 
reduces, and in the limit removes, the gap between demand and supply.  
 
At the other extreme, in models of coordinated and centralised pay setting, the 
relative pay of young workers does not respond to changes in demand and supply. It 
depends on the preferences and bargaining power of trade unions and employers’ 
associations. The outcome of their interaction is often seen as promoting narrow and 
stable pay differentials among social groups, as defined by age, as well as education, 
industry, and sex.  
   6
The effects on youth outcomes in the labour market of any trend decline in the 
demand for youth labour differ between the competitive and coordinated scenarios. In 
the competitive case, holding constant other influences, youth pay falls – and the less 
responsive are demand and supply to changes in the price of youth labour, the bigger 
the fall. In the coordinated case, youth pay does not change, and the decline in 
demand causes a fall in youth employment, whose severity depends on the size of the 
decline in demand relative to supply at the fixed relative price of youth labour.  
 
In sum, the effects on youth outcomes of any adverse trend on the demand 
side depend on institutions of pay setting. The closer they are to the flexibility 
assumed in competitive theory, the more the effect is seen in youth pay rather than 
youth employment; the closer they are to the inflexibility of institutional theories of 
coordinated pay setting, the more the result shows up in youth employment than in 
youth pay.  
 
The difference between the two scenarios relates to two contemporary 
analytical traditions. The first is the distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ 
market economies, which corresponds broadly to that between the competitive and 
coordinated models of labour market adjustment (Hall and Sockice 2001). The second 
is policy debate over labour market ‘flexibility’. The advocates of increased 
flexibility, which include the OECD and many labour economists, advocate the 
liberalisation of pay setting in general, and relative pay flexibility by age in particular. 
Although few commentators advocate labour market rigidity per se, some have 
pointed to the discrepancy between the proposed and the realised benefits of increased 





The inferences derived from Figure 1 can however only be tentative. One 
limitation is that not much can be inferred concerning the effects of three variables (a 
trend in demand, school-to-work institutions, and pay-setting institutions) from just 
seven observations. A second is that, even were demographic effects effectively 
controlled by standardising for population size, changes in educational participation 
could still be expected to cloud the evidence.  
 
Third, differences in the availability of pay and employment data across 
countries make it impossible to pick for all countries a single period for which the 
change in both youth outcomes – relative pay and employment – is measured. 
Although for most countries the available data span at least 20 years, those for 
Germany and the Netherlands cover only twelve years. The data in figure 1 cover 
therefore the maximum period for which data on both pay and employment were 
available. This approach has the advantage of maximising the cumulative size of any 
underlying trend in the demand for youth labour, but it has two disadvantages: 
different periodisations for different countries, and uncontrolled cyclical components 
in the demand for youth labour. 
 
These deficiencies are now countered by three changes: first, including more 
countries; second, revising the choice of national measurement periods in order to 
remove cyclical effects; third, analysing changes in educational participation.   7
 
More countries and cyclically neutered periods 
 
Changes in youth pay and employment can be measured across the same 
period in six other developed countries – Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Italy, 
and South Korea – which are now included alongside the seven in Figure 1. The 
sample size increases substantially in relative terms, even if it is still small in absolute 
terms. 
 
The second change responds to the lack of controls for cyclical effects on the 
demand for youth labour in the evidence in Figure 1. The tendency of youth 
unemployment to vary more with economic activity than does its adult counterpart is 
well established (Blanchflower and Freeman 2000). The changes in youth outcomes 
reported in Figure 1 may therefore be distorted by differences in the national 
economy’s cyclical position in the opening year and in the closing year.  
 
The measurement periods chosen for Figure 1 were the longest available, 
consistent with maximising the cumulative size of any trend in youth outcomes. That 
criterion is now replaced with that of maximising the visibility of the trend, by 
picking for each country the longest cyclically-neutral period available – which is 
taken to be the longest period, centred on the late 1980s, for which the adult male 
unemployment rate – the standard indicator of the cyclical state of the aggregate 
labour market
1 – was similar at both its start and its end.  
 
The tendency of adult unemployment to rise in most economies after the mid-
1970s means that the duration of the chosen period is shorter than is desirable, at 
between seven years (Italy) and twelve years (Australia, Canada and Japan).
2 The 
brevity of these periods means that any trend in youth outcomes will be 
correspondingly smaller and, on that count, harder to detect, than in the longer periods 
used for Figure 1. The benefit is the broad neutering of the cyclical component in 
youth labour demand. 
 
Figure 2 shows the effects of these two adjustments.
3 The pattern established 
by Figure 1 remains intact in particular respects. First, evidence of substantial youth-
based deterioration now applies to eight countries, not just four – though, not 
surprisingly, shorter time periods are associated with smaller changes in pay-
employment space than in Figure 1. 
 
Second, the deterioration again involves either relative employment (in France 
and Belgium) or relative pay (with Canada, Australia, Italy and the Netherlands 
joining the UK and the US), but not both: i.e., no country shows a substantial decline 
in both the pay and the employment dimensions. Indeed, the contrast between ‘liberal’ 
                                                 
1 The unemployment rate of adult males provides an imperfect guide to labour market slack over time, 
given changes in the frictional and structural components of unemployment, as well as in labour market 
policies and official definitions of unemployment. 
2 It was not possible to pick a start year and an end year with essentially the same rate of adult male 
unemployment for Finland or France, whose adult male rates were 2 points lower and 1 point higher, 
respectively, at the end than at the start of the period. 
3 The change in youth outcomes in Canada and Italy are sufficiently close for the position of the two 
countries to coincide in Figure 2.   8
and ‘co-ordinated’ market economies in terms of the focus of adjustment – price or 
quantity – is sharpened by the arrival of Australia and Canada alongside the UK and 
the US in the former category, and of Belgium alongside France in the latter. 
 
Third, in the other five countries, no significant deterioration occurred in 
either the pay or the employment dimension. This category now includes, in addition 
to Germany and Japan, Sweden, Finland and South Korea. In Korea, youth relative 
pay even rose, albeit only moderately. 
 
Controlling for demand cyclicality alters particular details. The first is the 
absence for Sweden, and also for Finland, of any trend deterioration through 1990. 
The implication is that the large falls in relative youth employment that show up when 
the period for both countries is extended to the mid-1990s, as for Sweden in Figure 1, 
were caused by the severe cyclical downturns that both countries experienced in the 
early 1990s. The evidence suggests no trend deterioration in either case – through the 




The second effect of controlling for cyclical factors is some clouding of the 
distinction between pay and employment as modes of adjustment to labour market 
imbalances. Italy and the Netherlands – countries that are not typically classed as 
liberal market economies – join the English-speaking countries in the group of 
countries that show a substantial change in youth pay but not in youth employment. 
 
Nevertheless, the role of pay-setting institutions in labour market adjustment is 
broadly strengthened by including more countries and controlling for economic 
fluctuations. A significant positive correlation is present between the change in youth 
relative pay (Figure 2) and the Hall-Gingerich (2004) index of national coordination 
of labour relations (Table 1).
4 Countries with less co-ordinated pay setting institutions 
show lower rates of growth of youth pay, which in most cases means a larger fall in 
youth relative pay.  
 
Separate indices of trade union membership, bargaining coverage, and 
bargaining co-ordination are also associated in the expected direction with the change 
in youth relative pay, but none attains statistical significance. These results parallel 
the associations found by OECD (2004) between labour market institutions and 
relative youth outcomes, and by Blau and Kahn (1999) between institutions and pay 
inequality. 
 
The third issue is the role, if any, of national school-to-work institutions. The 
evidence for such effects is if passively strengthened by the departure of the 
Netherlands from the ‘no deterioration’ group – which removes the leading anomaly 
facing this interpretation of the evidence in Figure 1. At the same time, the absence of 
distinctive school-to-work institutions in Sweden and Finland – countries whose 
reliance on full-time upper-secondary education makes for difficult school-to-work 
transitions (Shavit and Müller 1998) – weakens support for the hypothesis that strong 
                                                 
4 The Hall-Gingerich index is based on a factor analysis of differences across 20 advanced economies 
around 1985-95 in the level and extent of coordination in pay-setting (three categories each) and the 
rate of labour turnover in the economy as a whole.   9
school-to-work institutions are what exempt countries from an adverse general trend 
in youth labour market outcomes.  
 
Changes in educational participation 
 
The evidence considered here is confined to young adults partly in order to 
reduce the obscuring effect of changes in educational participation, which increased 
after the 1970s more strongly for teenagers than for young adults. Had educational 
participation remained unchanged, Figure 2 would provide a potentially valid guide to 
trends in the demand for youth labour, given that cyclical fluctuations have been 
neutered on the demand side and demographic ones on the supply side.  
 
However, as the educational participation of young male adults did increase in 
all countries, the interpretation of changes in youth outcomes must be pressed further. 
Comparable data on educational participation by age are available only from 1996. In 
that year, between one-quarter and one-half of 20-24 year old males were 
educationally active, according to country (Table 2, column 1).
5 The extent to which 
the participation rate increased during the periods studied here can be estimated by 
constructing a ‘pseudo’ participation rate, which is defined as the ratio of enrolments 
in tertiary education to the young adult population (males only; columns 3, 5). It 
suggests that participation increased in all thirteen countries, and that the increase 
differed greatly from country to country: small (less than a six percentage point rise) 
in Germany, Japan, and Sweden, but large (more than a 25 point rise), in Australia, 
Canada, Finland, and South Korea. 
 
The pseudo participation rate is a weak measure of the absolute level of young 
adult participation in any particular country or year, given that some young adults 
participate also in upper secondary and adult education, and that many participants in 
tertiary education are teenagers or adults, not young adults. It is however potentially 




As youth educational enrolments increased in all countries, it is not possible to 
control for the effect on youth outcomes – as was done on the demand side for the 
effect of economic fluctuations – simply by comparing years with similar educational 
participation rates. Two alternatives are then feasible. The first is to estimate 
econometrically the effects of increased participation on youth outcomes and use the 
result to hold participation statistically constant. The second, less ambitious, option is 
to use the qualitative attributes of changes in youth outcomes to distinguish changes 
in demand-side influences from those in educational participation on the supply side. 
The latter course is adopted here. 
 
                                                 
5 The educational participation rate of 20-24 year old males averaged 34.6 per cent in 1996 in the 
fifteen advanced economies for which comparable data are available (OECD 1999: Table D1.2a). 
6. In particular, the prominence of 18-19 year olds in tertiary enrolments, particularly in the English-
speaking countries, means that the pseudo participation rate is seriously flawed as a guide to absolute 
enrolment rates. However, if the shares of 18-19 year olds and adults (25+) in tertiary enrolments 
change little as enrolments rise, the pseudo participation rate should provide a reasonable indicator of 
the change in the educational participation rate of young adults.   10
The simplest way to analyse the association between youth labour market 
outcomes and the change in educational participation is to assume that participation is 
the causal variable, and youth pay and employment the dependent ones. Thus, in 
human capital theory, if young people’s expectations of the gain in future income 
resulting from acquiring additional schooling increase, and if no students are 
employed while enrolled in schooling, an increase in educational enrolments reduces 
the relative supply of youth labour on a ‘one for one’ basis.  
 
The effect of the change is to reduce youth employment. In that respect it is 
indistinguishable from an adverse trend in the demand for youth labour. The role of 
the two factors may however still be distinguished because their implications for 
youth pay differ, under competitive pay setting at least: a negative trend in the 
demand for youth labour increases the oversupply of youth labour and lowers youth 
relative pay; a negative trend in the supply of youth labour reduces the oversupply of 
youth labour and raises youth relative pay. Thus, the rise in the relative pay of more 
educated workers, alongside that in their relative employment, in the US in the 1980s 
has been interpreted as evidence of a more rapid increase in the demand for than in 
the supply of skills (Katz and Autor 1999). 
 
The difference in predictions means that any adverse trend in labour demand 
may still be visible in the evidence, despite the absence of controls for changes in 
educational participation. When both youth relative pay and youth employment 
decline, the implication is that an adverse trend on the demand side not only features, 
but is even strong enough to reverse the effects of an upward trend in educational 
participation on the supply side. This analysis is summarised in the first three columns 
of Table 3 (panels A and B), which show the divergent implications for youth 
outcomes of shocks – i.e., autonomous trends – in supply and demand under 
competitive market conditions. 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, three complications must be addressed. 
The first concerns institutions of pay determination. If competitive conditions are 
assumed, and demand conditions held constant, youth employment falls and youth 
pay does indeed rise. If, however, pay differentials are rigid, youth pay remains 
unchanged but youth employment falls and youth unemployment rises. The analysis 
must therefore consider changes in youth unemployment, and not just in pay and 
employment. Column four of Table 3 (panels C and D) summarise the expected 
effects of the two types of shock on youth outcomes under coordinated pay setting 
with a rigid pay structure. In this case, the two can be distinguished only in terms of 
the change in unemployment, as both predict no effect on pay and a negative effect on 
employment.  
 
Second, as students are often employed while enrolled in schooling, an 
increase in educational participation need not mean a reduction in youth employment. 
Were student employment to increase faster than student numbers, e.g., as a result of a 
decline in public subsidies to university students, youth employment would be 
expected to rise, not fall, in association with educational expansion.    
 
In 1996, in fifteen advanced economies, an average of 24 per cent of 20-24 
year old male students were employed. The rate was low in continental European 
countries (except Finland), at between three and 15 per cent, and high in English   11
speaking ones, at between 38 and 65 per cent (Table 2, column 7). Data on changes in 
student employment rates are again scanty. Evidence that the 20-24 year old rate 
changed little in the US after 1989 (Juhn and Potter 2006: Table 6) may well apply to 
continental European ones as well, given that their rates remained low through 1996. I 
therefore take changes in youth outcomes in those countries to have been affected 
only marginally by changes in student employment. The same is however unlikely to 
apply to the other three English-speaking countries, whose student employment rates 
were high in 1996, with considerable scope for them to have grown since the 1970s. 
 
Third, there is the possibility that the change in educational participation, 
instead of driving youth labour market outcomes, may itself be caused by them, if 
only in part. When unemployment rises and jobs become harder to find, more young 
people may opt to continue (or return) to studying than to seek work. In that case, 
instead of acting as an autonomous supply-side cause of declining youth employment, 
increased educational participation actually indicates the underlying youth-related 
deterioration in labour demand. Its expected effect would be to reduce the extent to 
which reduced youth employment leads to increased youth unemployment, and to 
reduce pressures for a decline in youth pay. 
 
The importance of this factor depends on the extent to which young people’s 
decisions to enrol in education depend on current labour market conditions, as 
opposed to future ones – an issue concerning which the evidence is limited and 
mixed.
7 A strong contribution from youth joblessness to educational enrolments 
characterises discussions of the evidence for France (Verdier, 1993). National micro-
data typically reveal positive relationships between youth unemployment and 
educational participation. The association proves however only modest in some 
contexts. Using time-series evidence for the period between the late 1960s and the 
mid-1990s in four countries – Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK – 
McIntosh (2001: 69) concludes that ‘the level of unemployment seems to play only a 
small part in the decision of whether to remain in education’.  
 
That conclusion is particularly challenging for Sweden, where educational 
participation and youth unemployment both rose strongly in the 1990s. It appears 
however that educational participation depends much more on prior educational 
attainment, pay differences by educational attainment among adults, and household 
income, than on youth unemployment.
8 I therefore treat changes in educational 
participation as largely, though not wholly, exogenous with respect to current 
employment and unemployment among young workers. 
 
Inferences concerning trends in labour demand  
 
                                                 
7 A causal effect from youth unemployment to educational enrolment is suggested by the positive 
association across countries between youth unemployment and youth educational participation (OECD 
1999: Chart D1.3). The relationship is particularly suggestive in view of the fact that any autonomous 
effect of enrolment on unemployment is expected to be negative. Such cross-sectional relationships are 
however potentially distorted by uncontrolled heterogeneity (differences) in unmeasured national 
attributes. 
8 McIntosh’s evidence for Sweden refers to the decision by 16 year olds to continue upper secondary 
education. His findings may therefore not translate directly to decisions by 20-24 year olds to 
participate in tertiary education.   12
Allowing for these three complications, what can be inferred about the trend in 
the demand for youth labour in developed countries? The framework in Table 3 is 
used here to classify some of the national experiences studied here. The assignment of 
countries to the four cells in Table reflects both their pay-setting institutions (Table 1) 
and their trends in youth pay and employment (Figure 2). Particular interest attaches 
to countries whose changes in youth outcomes suggest an adverse demand-side trend 
strong enough to dominate any opposing effects from increasing educational 
participation (i.e., Box B as opposed to Box A, and Box D rather than Box C). 
 
Box B, which combines flexible pay setting with a preponderance of demand-
side over supply-side trends, is potentially occupied by the four English-speaking 
countries (Australia, Canada, UK, USA). These economies saw little change in youth 
relative employment but a marked fall in youth relative pay.
9
 
France and Belgium are assigned to Box D: co-ordinated pay setting, with a 
preponderance of demand over supply shocks. Their pay-setting institutions are 
mirrored in the broad stability of youth pay. The large fall in youth relative 
employment in both countries could have been caused either by an autonomous 
increase in educational participation, or by an adverse trend in the relative demand for 
youth labour that in turn increased educational participation – or, more plausibly, 
some mixture of the two. As the adjustment of youth pay is taken to be institutionally 
blocked, changes in that dimension cannot – in contrast to the previous countries 
considered – be used to identify the relative importance of demand side and supply 
side factors. Instead, it is the rise in youth relative unemployment that suggests that an 
adverse trend on the demand-side has dominated.
10
 
The evidence for the other countries does not highlight any adverse trend in 
youth labour demand. That may be because, although such a trend exists, it is 
submerged by uncontrolled changes on the supply side. Alternatively, no universal 
trend may be present in the first place. 
 
The principal candidate for Box A in Table 3, which indicates a predominance 
of supply-side trends over any adverse demand-side trend, under pay flexibility, is 
South Korea. A large increase in educational participation (Table 2) was accompanied 
not only by falling youth employment but also by rising youth pay (Figure 2). The 
low ranking of South Korea on indicators of labour market co-ordination is consistent 
with this interpretation (Table 1). 
 
Trends in Italy and the Netherlands do not fit directly into the schema used 
here. The two countries show a moderate decline in youth pay, along with little 
change in youth employment. As educational participation increased moderately in 
both, student employment may be taken to have risen alongside educational 
participation. If so, the fall in youth pay might suggest, as for the English-speaking 
                                                 
9 This interpretation implicitly assumes that, in the four ‘Anglo-Saxon’ economies, employment 
increased among students at least as strongly as educational participation did among youth, given that 
youth employment did not fall, but even rose slightly. 
10 The ratio of youth (20-24) to adult (25-54) male unemployment rose from 2.7 to 3.2 in Belgium 
(1985-94) and from 2.6 to 2.8 in France (1987-97; OECD Labour Force Statistics:  
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=LFS_D). The scale of these increases is only 
moderate, and potentially affected by changes in activity on labour market programmes.   13
countries, an adverse demand-side trend – but the fall in youth pay is unexpected, 
given the two countries’ moderately high rankings for the co-ordination of pay-setting 
(Table 1). 
 
Finally, Germany, Japan and Sweden saw little change in youth pay, youth 
employment or educational participation during the periodisations used here. That 
suggests that any shocks on either the supply-side or the demand-side were weak. An 
alternative interpretation, as originally suggested for Germany and Japan, is that these 
countries also experienced an adverse trend in labour demand, but their school-to-
work institutions counteracted it. The latter reading appears less promising for 
Sweden than for Germany and Japan.
11
 
 Data  limitations 
 
The quality of the evidence used here also constrains the conclusions. The first 
limitation is aggregate nature: all types of young workers are lumped together. The 
result is that any youth-related trends in labour demand within the youth labour force 
are not captured. Murnane and Levy (1991) showed that the principal losers from the 
growth of pay inequality in the US in the 1980s had been young workers who had not 
completed secondary education. More recent data align with that in showing that the 
wage returns to education in the US have increased more strongly for younger than 
for older adults – a development that may reflect the more rapid growth in differences 
in computer usage at the workplace among younger than older workers (Card and 
DiNardo 2002). Their evidence suggests that adverse trends in labour demand have 
focused on less educated young workers, with the increasing computerisation of 
workplaces as a contributory factor.
12 The data used here do not permit any 
exploration of the interactions between experience and education within national 
trends in labour market outcomes. 
 
  The evidence is also potentially distorted by the increase in educational 
participation. To the extent that selection into education is positively related to 
intrinsic individual attributes, such as innate ability, the ability distribution of the 
youth labour force has been increasingly truncated from above – i.e., the ability of the 
average young worker has declined. Some part of the fall in youth relative pay may be 
explicable in these terms, particularly under decentralised pay setting, and that part 
does not denote any adverse trend in intrinsic youth outcomes. It is unlikely, however, 
that the greater fall in youth pay in the English-speaking economies than in France 
and Belgium could be explained in such terms, as educational participation rose 
substantially in all those countries. 
 
  Finally, the limited coverage of pay and employment statistics may distort the 
evidence – as notably in Japan, where the more rapid growth of non-regular 
employment contracts for young employees than for adult ones is not captured by 
official pay statistics. The threat is that the change in youth pay is then overestimated, 
                                                 
11 Finland would be placed in this group had its large increase in educational participation been 
accompanied by a commensurate rise in student employment. 
12 Card and DiNardo note that the reversal over the period 1979-99 of the decline in computer use with 
age may help explain rising pay differences by experience – i.e., lower youth relative pay, in the 
approach used here. But the change in this respect within experience groups was much greater than that 
between them.   14
and that in youth employment underestimated (in absolute terms) . The damage done 
is however contained here by the focus on young adult males during 1987-97: the 
growth of non-regular employment was less for that category in that period than for 





The evidence presented here is suggestive, but not conclusive, concerning the 
hypothesis of a youth-unfriendly trend in labour demand in all developed economies, 
such as might derive from skill-biased changes in production technologies and 
international trade patterns. 
 
Prior evidence suggestive of such a trend has been strengthened by including 
more countries and controlling for cyclical effects in youth employment. The 
distorting effects of increases in educational participation could however be 
counteracted only selectively. Moreover, the data themselves are weakened by their 
limited coverage of youth employment, by the absence of breakdowns by educational 
achievement, and by compositional changes in the intrinsic qualities of the youth 
labour force.  
 
More positively, the evidence does suggest a demand-led youth-related 
deterioration in the labour market in particular groups of countries – notably 
Australia, Canada, the UK, and the USA, on the one hand, and France and Belgium, 
on the other. The decline in youth relative pay in the former group, and the increase in 
youth relative unemployment in the latter one, penetrate the clouding effect of 
increases in educational participation, and provide evidence of substantial demand-
side deterioration for young workers. 
 
It is however not possible to explain in such terms the similar stability of 
youth outcomes in Sweden and – in particular, given its large increase in educational 
participation – Finland, two countries whose lack of distinctive school-to-work 
institutions discourages an interpretation that sees such institutions as potentially 
conferring immunity from adverse developments in technology and trade. Given also 
the youth-favouring developments in South Korea, the evidence does not permit us to 
infer the presence of any universally youth-unfriendly trend in the demand for labour 
in developed economies. 
 
On related issues, the evidence is consistent with a significant role for national 
institutions of pay-setting in the evolution of youth relative pay. Greater pay 
flexibility, associated with more decentralised pay setting in the English-speaking 
economies, contrasts with relative pay stability in the continental European and 
Japanese economies, associated with more centralised and co-ordinated pay setting. 
 
Finally, the part played by the distinctive school-to-work institutions of 
Germany and Japan in those countries’ favourable trends in youth outcomes – if only 
for young male adults through the mid-1990s – remains unclear. It is true that none of 
the countries in which either youth relative employment or pay fell can boast any 
                                                 
13 The share of non-regular contracts male employment rose from 14.8 to 22.8 per cent for 20-24 year 
olds, as compared to 7.7 to 8.7 per cent for adults (25+) between 1987 and 1997 (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications, Employment Status Survey, various years).   15
equivalent to those institutions. But Finland and Sweden also showed no unfavourable 
trend in youth outcomes – if only through 1990 – and their school-to-work 
arrangements are not notably different from, let alone superior to, those of various 
other developed economies.   16
References 
 
Baker, D., A. Glyn, D. Howell and J. Schmitt (2004), ‘Labour market institutions and 
unemployment’, in D. Howell (ed.), Fighting Unemployment: the Limits of 
Free Market Orthodoxy. Oxford: OUP. 
Blanchflower, D. G. and R. B. Freeman (2000), Youth Unemployment and 
Joblessness in Advanced Countries. New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Blau, F.D. and L.Kahn (1999), ‘Institutions and laws in the labour market’, chapter 25 
(pp. 1400-1461) of O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Handbook of Labour 
Economics, volume 3b. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Card, D. and J.E. DiNardo (2002), ‘Skill-biased technological change and rising wage 
inequality: some problems and puzzles’, Journal of Labour Economics; 20(4); 
733-83. 
Card, D. and A.B. Krueger (1995), Myth and Measurement: the New Economics of 
the Minimum Wage. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Christopoulou, R. (2007), Youth unemployment in advanced economies, doctoral 
dissertation in progress, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge University.  
Hall, P.A. and D. Soskice (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: OUP. 
Hall, P.A. and D.W. Gingerich (2004), ‘Varieties of capitalism and institutional 
complementarities in the macroeconomy’; Working Paper MPIfG 04/05, Max-
Planck Institüt für Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne. 
Juhn, C. and S. Potter, ‘Changes in labour force participation in the United States’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer; 20(3); 27-46. 
Katz, L. and D. Autor (1999), ‘Changes in wage structure and earnings inequality’, 
chapter 26 (pp. 1463-1555) of O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Handbook of 
Labour Economics, volume 3b. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Levy, F. and R. Murnane, (1992), ‘US earnings levels and earnings inequality: a 
review of recent trends and proposed explanations’, Journal of Economic 
Literature; 30(3); 1333-81. 
McIntosh, S. (2001), ‘The demand for post-compulsory education in four European 
countries’, Education Economics; 9(1); 69-88. 
OECD (1994), OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (1999), Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2002), OECD Employment Outlook 2002. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2004), ‘Wage setting institutions and outcomes’, chapter 3 of OECD 
Employment Outlook 2004. Paris: OECD. 
Ryan, P. (2001), ‘The school-to-work transition: a cross-national perspective’, Journal 
of Economic Literature; 39(1), 34-92. 
Shavit, Y. and W. Müller (eds) (1998), From School to Work. Oxford: OUP. 
Verdier, E. (1993), ‘Educational investment and employment in France: the 
increasing cost of adjustment in the 1980s’, paper presented to RAND 
conference on Human Capital Investment and Economic Performance, Santa 
Barbara, November.   17
Table 1. National pay-setting institutions and their correlation with the change in 
youth relative pay 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


























Australia -7.8  4  2  40  80 
Belgium -0.3  7  4  54  90 
Canada -6.2  2  1  33  90 
Finland   0.9  10  5  72  90 
France 0.1  6  2  10  80 
Germany 2.0  11  4  31  80 
Italy -6.3  8  3  39  20 
Japan 0.0  12  4  25  20 
Korea (S)  3.8  n.a.  1  17  20 
Netherlands -4.1  5  4  25  70 
Sweden 0.8  9  3  80  80 
UK -9.4  3  1  39  40 












Sources. Column (1): as for Figure 2; (2): Hall and Gingerich (2004), Figure 1; (3)-(5): OECD (2004), 
Tables 3.3, 3.5. 
Notes: asterisk indicates significantly different from zero (5% level of significance) 
a. Correlations exclude Korea 
b. Minima (e.g., ‘80+’ is taken to be 80) 
c. Rank correlation of variable with change in youth relative pay (column 1)   18




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
---------------     Educational participation rate





























Australia  31.7 1983 28.3 1993 63.4 35.1 64.7 
Belgium  38.0 1985 29.5 1994 46.1 16.6  7.4 
Canada  36.6 1983 46.5 1992 80.7 34.2 41.0 
Finland    44.2 1983 32.5 1993 58.6 26.1 26.7 
France  48.5 1987 30.7 1997 49.8 19.1  5.6 
Germany  31.3 1984 40.5 1994 45.9  5.4  11.5 
Italy  29.4 1987 28.2 1995 38.9 10.7  3.2 
Japan  n.a. 1987 37.4 1996 43.0  5.6  n.a. 
Korea  (S)  n.a. 1984 67.3 1995 95.0 27.6  n.a. 
Netherlands n.a. 1985 36.9 1995 45.8  8.9  n.a. 
Sweden 35.9  1984
e 31.0  1993  36.0 5.0 15.3 
UK 27.2  1984
e 24.2 1993 38.4 14.2 37.9 
USA  32.3 1983 59.4 1992 69.9 10.5 58.8 
Sources: cols (1) OECD (1999), Table D1.2a; cols (3), (5): UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, various 
years (Paris: UNESCO); OECD online education database 
(http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=LFS_D) 
Notes: percentages of young adult male population 
a. Share of young adult male population 
b. Share of young adult male student population  
c. Taken from national household-based labour force surveys 
d. Enrolments (part-time and full-time) in tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-7) as a percentage of 20-
24 year old population; males only; taken from most recent edition in which data are available; where 
data are available for both years from OECD and UNESCO, the former are preferred. 
e. Adjusted by one year from that in Figure 3 in order to avoid break in series (Sweden) or owing to 
gap in population series (UK)   19
Table 3. Predicted effect of demand and supply shocks on youth outcomes in the 
labour market, by type of shock, outcome, and pay-setting institutions 
 
Negative shock
a Change in youth 
relative 
Pay-setting institutions 
   Competitive  Co-ordinated 
Pay   +    0 
Employment       (A) -       (C) - 
Supply 
(e.g. educational 
participation)  Unemployment 
 
 0  0 
Pay   -    0 
Employment       (B) 0       (D) - 
Demand 
(e.g., skill-biased 
technical  change)  Unemployment   0  + 
Notes: Wage-elasticity of supply is assumed to be zero 
a. Autonomous leftward move in relative demand or supply curve 
Sign is physical change 
   20







-30.0 -25.0 -20.0 -15.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0























































































   21
Source: Ryan (2001) Figure 2; data taken from OECD, Labour Force Statistics and Earnings Database (unpublished)   22
Figure 2.  Changes in pay and employment of young adults relative to prime-age adults: male employees in thirteen advanced economies 
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Sources: as Figure 1  
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